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TAXING THE ABC TRANSACTION:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH *
I. THE NATURE AND PRESENT TAXATION OF THE ABC TRANSACTION
The intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code have encouraged the
development of a number of unusual business transactions designed to
minimize the participants' taxes. One of the most significant of these has
been the so-called ABC transaction,' which is used to finance the develop-
ment of productive oil and gas properties. The ABC is designed to secure
maximum tax benefits for three individuals: A, the holder of the working
interest 2 in developed or substantially developed oil and gas properties;
B, an operator looking for new production areas; and C, a financier who
either has substantial funds of his own or can obtain a loan from a bank.3
The nature of the transaction may be illustrated by a simple example.
If A wishes to sell 4 his working interest to B for one million dollars, but
B has only 200,000 dollars on hand, B has two alternatives open to him.
He may either make an outright purchase or employ the ABC method.
A comparison of the consequences of these two alternatives will show the
tax minimization effects of the ABC.
If B chooses to make an ordinary purchase, he will have to borrow
the other 800,000 dollars which he needs. The lender will then take a
mortgage on the working interest of the property. Since A will have
disposed of his entire property on the sale to B, he will receive capital
gains on the full one million dollar purchase price. As the oil pays out,
B will include all of the production proceeds in his income subject to
either cost or percentage depletion. The loan will then be liquidated from
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Parker C. Fielder, William H.
Francis, Jr. Professor of Taxation, University of Texas and Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania, 1964-65, whose criticisms and suggestions were of
invaluable aid in the writing of this Comment.
I For various examples of the ABC see, e.g., MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL T.AXEs
12A6 (39th ed. 1964); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as
Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 14 So. CAL. TAx INST. 47, 67 (1962); McClure,
Effect of Supreme Court Decision in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake et al. in Transfers
of Production Payments, 7 OIL & GAs TAx Q. 245, 255-56 (1958); Minyard, How
To Detemnine the Tax Saving That Makes an ABC Deal Worthwhile, 12 J. TAXA-
TION 290 (1960); Wilkinson, ABC-From A to Z, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 673 (1960);
The "Nassau" Plan of Acquisition of Oil Properties, 4 OIL & GAs TAx Q. 214,
224-25 (1955). Some writers use the designation C to refer to the individual termed
B in this Comment.
2 "A working interest is the label given the interest owned by the operator of
the oil properties." Note, Federal Taxation of Oil Payment Transactions, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 1088 n.7 (1956).
3 See Comment, A Simplified Explanation of the ABC Transaction, 10 LoYoLA
L. REv. 249-50 (1961).
4 The sale is often prompted by the seller's need to fulfill his lease obligations.
One obligation which can cause obvious difficulties is the "continuous drilling clause"
which requires repeated drilling within short periods. Id. at 249.
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the profits that remain after taxes. This is the usual tax consequence
of any purchase-mortgage situation.
If the ABC alternative is employed, completely different tax results
may be obtained by B. These results are made possible by certain concepts
currently employed in oil and gas taxation. Using the ABC, B will
purchase the working interest and equipment from A for 200,000 dollars,
and A will reserve a production payment in the amount of 800,000 dollars,
plus a sum equal to six percent annually on the unliquidated balance of
the payment and plus the aggregate total of taxes and expenses which
will be charged to him because of his ownership of the oil payment.5 This
production payment is a right to receive the proceeds from a fraction of the
oil produced by the oil property, free of development and operating costs,
until a fixed sum of money has been obtained.6 Unlike a royalty, it is
limited to a period less than the full life of the property. The reserved
production payment has been classified as property retained by A rather
than as part of the consideration received by A from B. 7 After the transfer
to B, A therefore allocates his basis in the property between the conveyed
working interest and the retained production payment.8 Although A has
retained a production payment, present law treats A as having made a
"sale" of the underlying leasehold for capital gains purposes. The 200,000
dollars is therefore accorded the favorable capital gains rates.
Simultaneously with (or shortly after) the A-B transaction, A will
sell the reserved production payment to C.9 To enable himself to purchase
the production payment, C will usually make arrangements to borrow the
needed 800,000 dollars from a bank. He will execute a promissory note
which will obligate him to pay five percent interest annually and will
pledge the production runs as collateral for the loan.' 0 Current law also
treats the A-C conveyance as a capital transaction; A will therefore obtain
the same rates for the full one million dollars that he receives in a purchase-
mortgage transaction. B's tax status, however, is considerably altered.
The production payment in the ABC is now considered to be a separate
economic interest. Consequently, the proceeds attributable to it are in-
5 The Case for ABC, OIL & GAS TAx Q. 1, 2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
ABC].
64 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 24.23(b) (1960); Rowen, Introduc-
tion to Oil and Gas Interests, 34 TAXES 19, 21 (1956); Trevathan, Federal Tax
Aspects of Oil Production Payments, 35 TAXES 179 (1957).
7 E.g., United States v. Witte, 306 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 949 (1963) (production payments on sand and gravel) ; Kline v. Commissioner,
268 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Howard Glenn, 39 T.C. 427 (1962) (dictum).
8 See F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 913 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 781 (1946); Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 118
F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1941).
9 Since the production payment is considered to be reserved property, its holding
period for capital gains purposes dates back to the time the lease was acquired, rather
than to the date the payment was reserved. Appleman, The ABC Transaction From
the Standpoint of the Seller, 21 N.Y.U. INsT. o N Fr. TAX. 973, 975 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as Seller].
10 ABC 3.
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cluded in the income of the owner of the payment rather than in the
income of the owner of the underlying leasehold.'1 The leasehold's pro-
duction is therefore divided between B and C in proportion to their respec-
tive interests. Since the production payment proceeds will go to C, B
will be able to exclude the money needed to pay the "mortgage" (here
C's investment) from his income and to obtain the benefit of both cost
and percentage depletion. 1 2  In turn, C's interest will entitle him to
depletion.' 3  C's profit will be the difference between the interest added
to the production payment and the interest paid to the bank on the loan.14
During the payout of the production payment, B will bear all the expenses
of the operation '3 -his share of the leasehold's production permits him
to meet these costs.16
II. CHALLENGES TO THE PRESENT TAX TREATMENT
OF THE ABC TRANSACTION
A. The Fate of the Carve Out
Since the Internal Revenue Service has given favorable rulings to
a number of ABC's over a period of years, the transaction has gained
considerable popularity and has been the instrument through which mil-
lions of dollars have been invested in the oil and gas industry. 17 Recent
developments have cast doubt upon the tax status of the ABC, however,
and its future is presently unclear. One of these developments was the
fate of the so-called "carve out." The sale of a production payment
coupled with the retention of an underlying longer lived interest in the
11 Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
1
2 SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 797 (1962). For figures
which indicate the quantitative tax advantages of the ABC to B, see Minyard, supra
note 1 at 291-92; Rowen, The ABC Transaction From the Viewpoint of the Pur-
chaser of the Working Interest, 21 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 957, 959 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Purchaser] ; note 66 infra.
'3 Early, The ABC Transaction From the Standpoint of the Oil Payment Pur-
chaser and the Lender, 21 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 939, 942-44 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Early].
14 Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 H-mv. L. Ruv.
1441, 1501-02 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Galvin].
15 See generally Purchaser.
16If B's share of production during the payout period does not meet expenses,
he must capitalize his added outlay as part of the acquisition cost of his depletive
interest. See id. at 970 (quoting text of service ruling so stating). Competent engi-
neering data, however, will usually assure B that his share will equal or exceed his
expenses. See ABC 3.
'7 Trevathan, supra note 6, at 189-91. For examples of rulings, see Purchaser 961.
The magnitude of some ABC transactions is best depicted by one notable example.
In June 1956, the Atlantic Refining Company acquired oil property from the Houston
Oil Company of Texas. Among the assets were 473 oil wells and 977,000 acres of
nonproducing mineral properties-properties which required more than 25,000 deeds
and more than two million pages of preparation to convey. Atlantic paid approxi-
mately $73,500,000 cash, and Houston retained two production payments amounting
to $125,000,000. These payments were payable out of 85% of the present oil and gas
production of the properties. Several intermediate companies immediately paid
Houston for the retained production payments. See generally "ABC" or "XYZ"
Private Ruling, 6 OIL & GAs TAx Q. 51 (1956).
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same property is labeled a "carve out." 18 Proceeds received on the sale
of such "carve outs" were originally accorded capital gains treatment, but
in 1946 the Service took the position that cash received on their sale
would be considered a mere anticipation of income. 19 This would result
in the cash being treated as ordinary income subject to depletion. This
position was not immediately accepted by the courts, however, and many
years of losing court battles passed before the Service finally prevailed
in 1958 in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.20  Although Lake's factual
situation dealt with a pure carve out, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion spoke
in broad terms of anticipation of income and did not limit itself to the
specific facts of the case. Storm warnings were raised for the ABC when
the Service used this broad approach successfully to attack transactions
which were not pure carve outs.2 ' Braced by these subsequent victories,
the Service suspended ABC rulings on July 17, 1961, and stated that it
was considering a possible change in tax treatment. This move generated
so much protest, however, that in September of the same year the Service
resumed its approval of ABC rulings in "arm's length" transactions
between "unrelated parties," with the proviso that further word would
be forthcoming.2 2 No additional action has yet been taken.23
18 See Schoenbaum, New Legislation, Regulations and Other Recent Develop-
ments Affecting the Taxation of Oil and Gas Income, 8 TULANE TAX INST. 338,
351-52 (1959). Definitions are given in MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12.44;
Bergen, Oil Payments and the Investor, 4 ROcKY MT. MINERAL L. INsT. 87, 94-95
(1958) ; Simon, Supreme Court Says No to Capital Gain Treatment of Carved-out
Oil Payments, 37 TAXES 61 (1959).
19 G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BULL.. 66; see Ray & Hammonds, The Income Tax
on Proceeds From the Sale of Oil Payments: The Validity of G.C.M. 24849, 25
TEXAs L. REv. 121 (1946).
20356 U.S. 260 (1958). For a complete discussion of the history of the con-
tentions on carve outs, see Benjamin & Currier, The Supreme Court and Taxation
of Oil, Gas and Production Payments: the Lake Cases, 19 LA. L. Rnv. 579 (1959);
Hammonds & Ray, Oil Payments Revisited: Current Income Tax Status of Oil Pay-
inents, 33 TAXES 349 (1955) ; More About the Carved-out Oil Payment Controversy,
6 OIL & GAs TAx Q. 231 (1957); Simon, supra note 18; 68 HARV. L. REv. 1081
(1955). For a general discussion of the Lake case, see Lyon & Eustice, supra
note 1; McClure, supra note 1; Schoenbaum, supra note 18, at 351.2 1 E.g., United States v. Foster, 324 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1963); Jay H. Floyd,
20 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 303 (1961); 0. W. Killam, 33 T.C. 345 (1959); see Lyon
& Eustice, supra note 1, at 67. See generally Appleman, The ABC Deal, 11 INsT.
OIL & GAs L. & TAX. 519, 529 (1960) [hereinafter cited as ABC Deal]; Bullion,
Production Payment Transactions-Recent Developments, 6 RocKY MT. MINERAL L.
INsT. 81 (1961) ; Soter, Taxation of Oil and Gas Financing Arrangements, 31 U. CINC.
L. REv. 1 (1962) ; Oil Payment Developments-Post P.G. Lake, 9 OIL & GAs. TAX Q.
133 (1960).
22B will not presently qualify for ABC treatment if he forms an alter ego cor-
poration C; furthermore, if A forms a corporation to act as B, the Service will
treat the transfer of the production payment to C as a carve out. MONTGOMERY,
op. cit. stpra note 1. Favorable rulings are also unavailable where the parties
possess a § 318 type relation in the most general way. The degree or percent of such
relation deemed critical varies from situation to situation. ABC Deal 556; Current
ABC Matters, 13 OIL & GAs TAx Q. 43 (1963); IRS Technical Information Re-
lease No. 338, Sept. 1961. It further appears that the Service will not issue any
rulings on ABC's where there are elements present which differ from those in prior
favorable rulings. Purchaser 962.
23 One tax accounting firm has promulgated five rules to follow to obtain favor-
able rulings. These are: (1) all negotiations must be bona fide and at arm's length;
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B. Criticism of the ABC
The present tax treatment of the ABC may be questioned on several
grounds. The treatment of A may be criticized because of the plan by
which he splits and sells his leasehold to obtain capital gains. That of
B may be attacked because he is able to exclude production proceeds from
his income, even though he would have to include them under a mortgaged
purchase. The taxation of C may be challenged because his role in the
ABC more closely resembles that of a lender than of an actual investor
in the oil in place.
This Comment will examine the economic structure of the ABC
and will suggest changes in the present tax treatment of the transaction.
Special emphasis will be placed upon the theories underlying the tax
treatment of each participant, since the tax consequences of the transac-
tion for any party are greatly affected by the manner in which the roles
of the others are classified for tax purposes. Thus, if A were not considered
as making a sale when he divides his leasehold and conveys to both B
and C, B would be forced to buy the entire leasehold to secure capital
gains for A on the full purchase price. This would force B into a
purchase-mortgage transaction, and change his tax treatment. Similarly,
if C's possession of the production payment were not classified as an
economic interest, the proceeds of that payment would be attributed to B
because of his ownership of the underlying leasehold. This would also
alter B's tax treatment.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ABC TRANSACTION
A. The Taxation of A
Although completed simultaneously, there are two separate trans-
actions in the ABC. These are the transfer of the leasehold to B subject
to the retained production payment, and the subsequent conveyance of the
production payment to C.
1. Transfer of the Leasehold to B With A Retaining the
Production Payment
Under current tax treatment, if A transfers a leasehold and retains
only a limited oil payment, he is considered to have made a sale and the
cash received is therefore accorded capital gains treatment. On the other
(2) the working interest must be disposed of prior to or simultaneously with the
sale of the oil payment; (3) the oil payment should not be so large in proportion
to the estimated recoverable reserves that it takes on the character of a reserved
royalty; (4) the purchaser of the working interest should receive a sufficient per-
centage of the production to cover expenses; and (5) the production payment must
be a bona fide economic interest, i.e., must be payable solely out of the proceeds from
the sale of the production of the property. NATURAL RESOURCES STAFF, ARTHUR
ANDERSON & CO., OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INcOME TAX MANUAL 313 (8th ed. 1960).
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hand, if A assigns the operating rights to his leasehold for cash, and
reserves an interest which will continue for the life of the lease (such as
an overriding royalty or a net profits interest), the transaction is considered
a sublease and the cash received is treated as an advance royalty bonus.
The 200,000 dollars would thus have been classified as depletable ordinary
income.2 4 Although A might later sell the retained royalty for 800,000
dollars-thus giving him the same one million dollars for his holdings-
only the 800,000 dollars would be accorded capital gains. The sale-
sublease distinction, which accounts for this varying treatment of the
200,000 dollars cash, turns upon the nature of the interest retained by A.
If the retained interest is a continuing one, the transaction is considered
a sublease; if noncontinuing, a sale 5 Since the oil payment does not
continue for the full life of the property, the A-B transaction is classified
as a sale, and A receives capital gains. The sale-sublease distinction
thus enables A to retain a substantial interest in the property and still
receive capital gains on the transfer of the underlying leasehold. 6 That
the classification of the A-B transaction as a sale should not rest upon the
mere noncontinuity of A's interest is emphasized by these benefits A
receives.
Whether there has been a "sale" for purposes of the capital gains
provisions of the Code depends upon whether there has been an outright
conversion of the vendor's property for a fixed price. Viewed from
a different perspective, a "sale" is a transaction by which an investor
concludes his investment and thereby establishes its success or failure
by "cashing it in" for its present worth.2 7  In this context, the vendor's
reservation of a production payment might profitably be compared to the
retention of a royalty.28 Retaining a royalty would continue A's invest-
ment for the life of the leasehold by guaranteeing him a share of any
benefits which might later accrue. On the other hand, a seller who retains
a production payment holds an interest which will not continue for the
life of the property; consequently, he can be considered as relinquishing
any other benefits-such as underestimated reserves-which the lease
might hold. Although the vendor thus loses some valuable incidents of
his investment, the question of whether there has been a complete divest-
ment for purposes of capital gains is not thereby fully resolved.29 That
24 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
2 See Cullen v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v.
Fleming, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
26 Section 1245 of the 1954 Code may convert some of the gains into ordinary
income, however. Seller 974 n.3.
27 SUmEY & WAuRN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 770.
28 "A royalty is an interest in oil which entitles its holder to a share in the
proceeds of the oil produced as long as there is production without . . . being
charged with the cost of development or operation." Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 1088
n.6 (1956).
2 9 Bullion, supra note 21, at 94-96, gives an example of another situation in
vhich complete divestment may be necessary for a sale. Suppose A sells his lease-
hold to B for one million dollars and B agrees that after a specified payout nev
1966]
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question-and with it the question whether there has been a "sale"--
would appear to turn instead on the nature of the production payment
itself. More specifically, is the payment actually a reservation of oil or
is it merely a right to a specific amount of money?
It has been argued that the current "sale" classification of the A-B
transaction is justified because the production payment is essentially a
reservation of oil. A is therefore viewed as selling only part of his oil
holdings and retaining the balance. This reasoning, however, is incon-
sistent. As noted above, a sale qualifying for capital gains treatment
results in a complete divestment for a present value. If it is decided that
the production payment is essentially a reservation of oil, with the holder
assuming real risks of ownership, it would follow that A has not made
a sale of the leasehold, since he has retained a stake in the property. De-
pendent upon future production for the ultimate return of his original
investment, he should not be considered as making the required divestment.
Only a classification of the production payment as a right to a fixed sum
of money would be consistent with the concept of sale. Such a classifica-
tion would view A as limiting his return to a current figure-the amount
of the payment plus the sum of the cash-and thus as converting his asset
at a present worth. This view seems more consonant with the economic
substance of the transaction.
In Commissioner v. Fleming,"° one of the early cases announcing
the sale doctrine, the Fifth Circuit stated that "it is true . . . that the
reservation was limited not to so many barrels nor to such a length of
time, but to so much oil as would sell for the agreed sum. But it was
in effect an exception or reservation of oil." Such a conclusion overlooks
the fact that the sole relationship of the production payment to the oil
in place is the payment's dependence upon oil production for its value.
True ownership of the oil in place would consist of ownership of a certain
percentage of oil for the life of the market. Although this incident of
ownership is retained by the holder of a leasehold or royalty interest, the
set, limited amount of the production payment deprives its holder of this
ownership feature. If the payment were a true reservation of oil, A and B
would each own a certain number of the estimated barrels in place after
the reservation, and those barrels would then be subject to varying market
prices. If the price of oil subsequently rose, each owner's return on his
investment would then be increased because the proportional worth of
each barrel would go up; if the price of oil were to decrease, each owner's
engineering estimates will be made and a new consideration will be paid to A on
the basis of such estimates. Bullion notes that the Service ruled, even after Lake,
that A was entitled to capital gains on both the one million dollars and the added
consideration, but that the Service is presently holding back such rulings. He
questions this rethinking, since A has disposed of his entire depletable interest in this
initial transaction, and thus under I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BuLL. 10, should be ac-
corded capital gains. Viewing the problem as requiring an initial divestment, how-
ever, could settle the question.
50 82 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1936).
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return per barrel would also decrease. To equate the production payment
with ownership of a portion of the oil in place introduces the anomaly of
shifting ownership, since if the price of oil rises, the number of estimated
barrels owned by A decreases while B's total increases. Nor does the
formalistic contention that the ownership in question is ownership of "so
much oil as would sell for the agreed sum" seem to meet this problem
adequately.
Reinforcing the conclusion that the production payment does not
constitute ownership of the oil in place is the fact that its payout is quite
certain, and therefore that the vendor has cashed in his investment with-
out running any significant risk that his contracted return will be affected
by the future of the leasehold. In actual practice, the ABC is grounded
upon this certainty; if it were otherwise, the deal would not be consum-
mated.3 ' The use of modern scientific methods to estimate the oil reserves
in a specific property, and the availability of advanced techniques to
assure maximum recovery, make the potential yield the subject of close
approximation.32  Further assurance that the oil payment will completely
pay out is supplied by the customary insistance of the financing bank that
the payment terminate far short of estimated reserves so that its security
will be protected. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the produc-
tion payment is, in the words of the Lake case, "ascertained with consider-
able accuracy" and almost certain to pay out.
33
Further support for treating the production payment as a right to
a definite sum of money is given by the economic position of A after as-
signment of the leasehold. The money he would receive each year under
the terms of the production payment is ordinary income. He has neither
a reversion after receiving the contracted income, nor any right either
to control the amount of income to be produced from the land or to decide
whether the land should be used for other income producing purposes.
Since he is unaffected by the market place and has a right to draw a
definite amount of income from regularly producing wells, he is subject
to little risk. The only actual "ownership" risk which he bears is the
risk of insufficient production and this is factually unlikely. Thus, if the
tax law is to fulfill its function of dealing in economic realities and not in
legal abstractions, 34 it should consider the owner of the production payment
as holding a mere right to receive income and not as being the owner
of the oil in place.
As stated above, by viewing the production payment as a right to a
definite amount of money, A can be considered to have converted his
asset for present worth-the cash plus the amount of the payment. Unlike
3' Early 944.
-32 See Welsch, Acquiring Properties Through Oil Payments and Related Methods,
32 TAXES 494 (1954). For a brief description of the type of procedure used in oil
discovery, see Galvin 1479-81.
33 Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U. S. 260, 265 (1958).
34 Commissioner v. Southvest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 315 (1956).
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the situation in which the vendor retains an overriding royalty which will
continue for the life of the lease, A has settled for a total present realiza-
tion of the value of his leasehold and may therefore be treated as having
made a sale. In such a situation the A-B transaction may be considered
as a credit sale to B, with the cash constituting a down payment and the
production payment being an account receivable. A would then be in
the position of a mortgagee without a bond or of a creditor who may not
look to the personal liability of the debtor but must look instead to a particu-
lar fund for his payment. A could avoid the problem of having to declare
the total amount of the payment in the year of sale by using the install-
ment method of accounting. Although the foregoing analysis retains the
well settled sale doctrine, it reaches this result under a more economically
accurate rationale. Only within this context is the sale result warranted.
2. Transfer of the Production Payment to C
The second transaction in the ABC is A's conveyance of the reserved
production payment to C. As discussed above the current reasoning sup-
porting a "sale" result in the ABC rests upon the theory that A has reserved
a quantity of oil. If the ABC is to be considered a credit transaction with
respect to B, however, it should also be considered a credit transaction
with respect to C. Adoption of such an approach requires a rejection
of the current theories relating to the A-C transaction.
Four major defenses have been advanced in favor of the current capital
gains treatment of the A-C conveyance.35 It has been argued that: (1) the
production payment is property for purposes of section 1231 and there-
fore a capital asset entitled to capital gains when sold; 3 (2) since the
production payment is the entire depletable interest which A owns, he is
entitled to capital gains upon its sale; (3) regardless of the label placed
upon the payment, A has in two related transactions disposed of the whole
of a leasehold which was itself a capital asset, and therefore should be
accorded capital gains under the "step transaction" or "net effect" doc-
trine; and (4) since A could undoubtedly have obtained capital gains by
conveying the entire leasehold to C, with C then transferring the leasehold
to B subject to the oil payment, A should not be denied capital gains for
following the slightly different A-B-C route.
a. Capital Asset Argument
There are several arguments to support the proposition that the pro-
duction payment is a capital asset. It is asserted that the Internal Revenue
B5 ABC 1-3.
36 It might also be possible to classify the payment as an investment in real
property within the definition of § 1221 of the 1954 Code. As the holder of the
payment, A could be viewed as having invested in the right to receive income created
by another, and his gain could be seen as derived from this sale of a right which
he held for investment. The Supreme Court, 1957 Tern, 72 HARv. L. RFv. 77,
114 (1958).
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Service has recognized that it is property in many contexts: it has a
basis; 37 it has been held to be property of unlike kind when exchanged for
a royalty,38 for a working interest and a royalty,39 or for a working interest
only ;40 and a deduction has been permitted when it becomes worthless.
41
Moreover, the Service has held that a transfer of a retained production
payment in an ABC transaction is subject to a documentary stamp tax as
a conveyance of realty."2 Even if it is granted that the oil payment is
"property" in a general tax sense, however, it does not follow that it is
"property" for purposes of the capital gains section. The problem has
been stated well by Professors Surrey and Warren:
A consideration of the problems created by the all-inclusive scope
of "property" in the statutory definition of capital asset leads to
* . . [a] source of difficulty. Congress as respects capital gains
presumably had in mind a distinction between recurring receipts
such as salaries, wages, interest, rents, dividends, royalties, and
the like on the one hand and the nonrecurrent realization of the
appreciation in the value of property on the other . . . . [T]he
right to a salary earned, or to interest accrued, or a dividend due,
is "property" in the legal sense. Does such a right when sold,
therefore, transport the salary, interest, or dividend out of the
ordinary income area and into the capital gain category via the
term "property" in the definition of capital assets ? 43
The capital asset argument would thus appear inconclusive.
b. Disposal of the Entire Depletable Interest
It has also been argued that A is entitled to capital gains because the
ABC transaction disposes of his entire depletable interest in the property.
This view is based upon Revenue Ruling I.T. 4003, 4 which established a
general rule that:
the assignment of any in-oil payment right (not pledged for de-
velopment), which extends over a period less than the life of the
depletable property interest from which it is carved, is essentially
37 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Laird, 91 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1937).
38 Midfield Oil Co., 39 B.T.A. 1154 (1939).
39 Kay Kimbell, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940).
40 Bandini Petroleum Co., 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 999 (1951).
41 Louisiana Iron & Supply Co., 44 B.T.A. 1244 (1941).
42 Rev. Rul. 59-282, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 332. For private rulings on this issue,
see Documentary Stamp Tax Status of Oil Payments, 6 OIL & GAs TAX Q. 181
(1957).
43 SuRRuy & WARR N, op. cit. mupra note 12, at 770.
441950-1 Cum. BuLL. 10, 11.
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the assignment of expected income from such property interest.
Therefore, the assignment for a consideration of any such in-oil
payment right results in the receipt of ordinary income by the
assignor ...
Although this rule would disqualify A from receiving capital gains on the
assignment of the production payment to C, the ruling established a weighty
exception-the above rule did not apply "where the assigned in-oil pay-
ment right constitutes the entire depletable interest of the assignor in the
property. . . ., 45 In Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.,46 the Supreme
Court cited the above ruling as representing "the present view of the
Commissioner." Some writers have interpreted this reference as an ex-
pression of judicial approval of the ruling, and therefore as authority for
granting A capital gains in his transaction with C.47 This conclusion,
however, overlooks the simple fact that the reference purports to do noth-
ing more than to supply information, and thus cannot be considered as
approving a capital gains theory. That the Supreme Court did not
intend its passing reference to support such a theory is also indicated by
its addition of a caveat that "'prior administrative practice is always sub-
ject to change 'through exercise by the administrative agency of its con-
tinuing rule making power.' "48
It might also be argued that McAllister v. Commissioner 49 supports
a capital gains treatment of the A-C transaction, irrespective of the char-
acter of the production payment. The taxpayer in that case had sold her
life income interest in a trust. Contending that this life interest was a
capital asset, she deducted a capital loss on her return. Although the
Commissioner asserted that the entire sales price should be ordinary in-
come, the court held with the taxpayer, reasoning that the transfer of an
entire interest in a right to receive future income should be accorded a
capital gain or loss.50 In reaching their result, the majority in McAllister
stated that "the distinction seems logically and practically to turn upon
anticipation of income payments over a reasonably short period of time
and an out and out transfer of a substantial and durable property interest,
such as a life estate at least is." 51 Even if this substantial versus insub-
45 Id. at 11. (Emphasis added.)
46 356 U.S. 260, 265 n.5 (1958).
47ABC 12-13. Appleman presses even further by stating that "the Lake de-
cision simply sustains the position of the Service, which position included recogni-
tion of the ABC deal." ABC Deal 530.
48 356 U.S. at 265, 266 n.5.
49 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).
50 See SURREY AND WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 773.
51 157 F.2d at 237.
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stantial distinction were accepted,52 it is by no means applicable to the
ABC transaction. Although a life estate, because of its length and its
indefiniteness, might be considered substantial, it certainly does not follow
that a limited production payment should also be so classified. The sale
of a royalty, which continues for the life of the property, would appear
more analogous. Thus, neither the entire depletable interest argument nor
the McAllister decision settle the question of whether A should receive
capital gains on his transaction with C.
c. The Step Transaction Doctrine
A much more persuasive argument for capital gains treatment is
based upon the so-called step transaction doctrine. It has been said that
"the government and taxpayers alike have long accepted the simple
mathematical equation that a simultaneous assignment of two parts com-
prising the whole is equal to a single assignment of the whole." 53 If A can
receive capital gains on the sale of his entire leasehold to one person, it is
argued that he should receive similar treatment when he converts the
leasehold in two related or simultaneous transactions. Such an argument
rests upon the undoubtedly true proposition that the vendor in a contem-
poraneous sale has all the property one minute, and all the cash the next.5
Although this net effect doctrine is not easily refuted, it may not nec-
essarily be controlling if A disposes of his entire interest in an incorrect
manner. For example, if A had separated his leasehold into two undivided
interests and had sold them to two different people, capital gains would seem
to be in order. Under present law a similar result would occur if A first
sold a royalty and then subsequently disposed of the leasehold.5 5 How-
ever, if A retains a royalty on the transfer of the leasehold to B (now con-
sidered a sublease transaction) and then transfers that royalty to C, a
different problem is presented. Should the "net effect" doctrine convert
the prior sublease with its resultant ordinary income into a capital gains
transaction? 56 Moreover, if A carves out an oil payment and then sub-
52 In a strong dissent, Judge Frank certainly did not accept it:
Congress believed that the exaction of income tax on the usual basis on
gains resulting from dispositions of capital investments would undesirably
deter such dispositions ....
I think it most unlikely that Congress intended by . . . [the capital
gains provisions] to relieve such a taxpayer of the ordinary tax burdens,
to supply an incentive for the demolition of such a trust.
Id. at 239, 241.
53ABC 5.
5 ABC Deal 529.
5 See Galvin 1499.
56 Appleman would say that it should:
In an ABC deal, however, in the author's opinion, it should make no
difference, so far as A is concerned, if the so-called oil payment interest is
600 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sequently sells the leasehold, would the latter conveyance relate back to
convert the proceeds from the carve out into capital gains? 57 It is doubt-
ful that the Internal Revenue Service would recognize such results. These
examples demonstrate that the step transaction doctrine provides a satis-
factory rationale for classifying the A-C transaction as a capital gains
transaction only if one is willing to concede that the type of interest ini-
tially retained by A should not be important so long as he sells the entire
leasehold in related transactions. If one cannot accept this proposition,
the problem posed by the transaction is left unsettled.
d. The A-C-B Alternative
A final argument for capital gains is that A could have conveyed the
entire leasehold to C-undoubtedly a capital gains transaction-and C
could then have transferred the leasehold to B subject to the reservation.
Since A could have followed an A-C-B route, it is argued, he should not
be penalized for following an A-B-C one.58 It does not follow, however,
that because A could have obtained capital gains by one method he should
be awarded them even if he pursues another. Moreover, in the A-C-B
scheme, C would be in the shoes of A and thus subject to all of the
criticisms of the A-C transaction made above.
e. Taxing the A-C Transaction
In sum, it would appear that the current arguments advanced for
capital gains treatment of A-C transaction are at best inconclusive, and
persuasive counterarguments can be made. A more reasonable approach
to the problem of whether this transaction should be accorded capital
gains treatment is to adopt a test which considers the character of the
particular interest sold.
Viewing the payment as a reservation of oil, some writers would at-
tempt to solve the capital gains issue by imposing upon the transaction
the famed tree-fruit structure enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Lucas v. Earl.5 9 The argument is that the allowance for depletion on the
payment is tacit recognition that part of the tree (the leasehold) was
retained with the production payment and therefore that capital gains
in fact an overriding royalty interest, for the reason that A, in substance
as well as in intent, has made a sale of all his interest in the property, albeit
to two parties, and not a sublease. It is doubtful if the Service would so
rule, but it is believed the Courts would so hold.
Seller 973, 976.
57 See ABC Deal 528. The importance of employing the proper sequence in the
ABC transaction to avoid the possibility of inadvertently creating ordinary income
is noted by Galvin, at 1501 n.187.
58 See ABC 16. A might also transfer the entire leasehold to X who in turn
would convey the working interest to B and a reserved production payment to C.
See ABC Deal 537 n.30.
59 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
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should be given on its sale. 60 It would seem, however, that a method by
which capital is returned tax free should not necessarily denote the
existence of a tree in the tree-fruit sense. 61 Moreover, the concept that
A disposed of the tree on the transfer of the leasehold to B, and retained
only the fruit which was then conveyed to C would seem to square equally
well with the Holmes metaphor.
On the other hand, if the production payment is viewed as a right
to a specific amount of ordinary income, the A-C transaction could be
considered as a mere anticipation of income,0 2 rather than as the conversion
of a capital asset. If the sale of a presently accrued right to income is
not to be accorded capital gains, it might fairly be argued that the sale
of a right to receive income in the future, when that income is relatively
certain, should not be a capital gains transaction either.0 3 The Lake case
lends support to such a view since it holds that the sale of a production
payment where its payout is certain can bring ordinary income, regardless
of property concepts. Nor is this approach answered by arguing that the
value of the payment, like that of any other income producing property,
reflects some anticipated future income to be derived from it,0 4 for such
an argument ignores the fact that the particular property involved in
the A-C transaction does not represent an economic value devoted to the
production of income, but is itself the product.
These problems can be avoided, however, if the A-C conveyance is
conceptually integrated with the credit sale treatment of the A-B transac-
tion. This would be accomplished, as discussed above, by viewing the
A-B transaction as a credit sale and the oil payment as an account receiv-
able. Under such an appoach the A-C conveyance would be viewed as an
assignment for cash of an account receivable. By employing this frame-
work, the well-established sale result of the A-B transaction is preserved,
and A retains his capital gains, a sound although not necessary result
since he has disposed of his entire property interest. The only change
is to substitute new reasons for reaching these results in order to square
the tax theory with the economic substance of the ABC transaction.
60 ABC 9 n.16a.
61 Ernest Brown has written this of Holmes' metaphor:
It is this apparently innocent figure of speech which has given to the
judicial law of deflected income a distinctly horticultural flavor. . . . Judges
perhaps more at home with common law ideas than Revenue Acts have
turned to search for a property concept which could constitute a tree capable
of being transplanted. If they could discover an income-producing property
"tree," capable of being transplanted and which had been transplanted or
transferred, then the deflection was successful. If no tree or no transplant,
then no deflection.
Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 1961 U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 15.
02 See Note, Distinguishing Ordinary Income From Capital Gain Where Rights
to Future Income Are Sold, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 737 (1956).
03 The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. Rnv. 77, 113 (1958).
04 See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv.
985, 1003-04 (1956).
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B. The Taxation of B 65
Since his gross income will be reduced by the full amount of the
production payment, B profits the most from the ABC transaction.66
Even under current tax treatment, however, B will lose this right to
exclude the proceeds from his income if he guarantees that C will obtain
the full amount of the payment. If any such personal liability is found
running from B to C, C will be held not to have an economic interest
and B will have to declare as ordinary income all the proceeds allocated
to the payment.6 - The Internal Revenue Service treats such transactions
as mere debt obligations. C's interest is found not to be a "true" produc-
tion payment, since the latter is a payment whose return is "derived solely
from the production of oil and gas." 68 The existence of any other source
6 See Minyard, How To Determine the Tax Saving That Makes an ABC Deal
Worthwhile, 12 J. TAXATION 290, 291-92 (1960) ; Purchaser 957-58.
66 Rowen calculates B's maximum tax advantages in the following manner:
(1) B's gross income while the production payment pays out will be
reduced by the full amount of the production payment.
(2) Assuming that B employs percentage depletion, the exclusion of the
amount of the production payment from B's gross income will reduce his
percentage depletion deduction by 27y2% of the amount of the production
payment.
(3) The net result of (1) and (2) is that B's taxable income from the
property is reduced by 72'% of the amount of the production payment.
(4) Assuming a 50% tax rate, this means that B will save 37% cents
(Y2 of 72y2 cents) in taxes for every dollar of A's selling price that is repre-
sented by the production payment.
In actual practice, B's tax advantage from the ABC transaction will not be so great.
First, the effect of the interest factor in the production payment, which
has been disregarded in the above computations, is to reduce the advantage
of the ABC transaction. Thus, if B purchased the property in the conven-
tional manner with the proceeds of a bank loan, the interest would be de-
ductable and would not reduce B's gross income for depletion purposes.
Under the ABC transaction the interest factor is wholly excluded from
B's gross income, and B thereby loses the benefit of percentage depletion on
the interest factor. The total tax detriment to B, assuming a 50% tax rate,
comes to 13Y cents on each dollar of "interest factor" that is paid. If the
"interest factor" were very high and the production payment did not pay
out for an unusually long time, this detriment might offset the benefit from
the ABC transaction, but in most cases the effect is relatively small.
Second, if the expected production from the property is such that B's cost
depletion would exceed percentage depletion if B acquired the property by a
conventional purchase, B's tax saving will be somewhat less than computed
above, but it would still be substantial in the early years.
Third, owing to the 50% of net income limitation, B ordinarily would
not obtain the full benefit of percentage depletion on B's share of the income
during the period of payout of the production payment.
Purchaser 960-61.
6 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Purchaser at 964.
18Anderson v. Helvering, supra note 67, at 413; ABC 18-19. Appleman found
that on a sample ABC, over a seven year period, B made approximately'a 45%
return of investment through the ABC and only 20% without it (the sample B was
in the 80% Bracket). Moreover, the larger the payment, the greater the return and
the less the risk. ABC Deal 523-26.
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of payment, such as a guarantee, nullifies this characteristic and deprives
B of the benefits ordinarily granted him under the ABC. 69
Since B depends upon C's purchase, he may attempt to provide some
alternative to a guarantee to pursuade C to purchase the oil payment.
Several roundabout methods might be employed. One such method is
the guaranteed market. Although reserves can be estimated, future prices
cannot. Thus, to protect C against a drop in price, B may agree to
purchase the oil and gas at a fixed price.70 Such an approach, however,
would not protect C if the oil reserves should run unexpectedly low or if
the well should run dry. To meet these problems, B might take an option
to purchase the production payment at a fixed price.71 Should production
then terminate, B will purchase the oil payment, thus allowing C. to regain
his investment. To avoid these problems altogether, B might establish
a dummy corporation to perform C's function. The corporation would
borrow the needed funds from a bank, and B would then obligate himself
to purchase its note in the event of a default. The last, and easiest, method
would be to make a simple under the table reimbursement.
Under a standard which requires a "true" production payment to be
"derived solely from the production of oil and gas," none of these plans
is satisfactory. Thus if any of these methods is employed, the payment
should not be treated as an independent interest. If C is to be considered
as a true owner, he should be required to bear all of the incidental risks
of ownership.
There are two principal theories which the Internal Revenue Service
might employ to attack B's position under the ABC. To begin with, it
could treat B as having bought all of the leasehold from A, and then as
having made a carve out of the oil payment to C. The second possibility
would be to treat the production payment as a mortgage debt for tax
purposes. This would be the same theory proposed earlier. Under this
69 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Galvin 1501. It might be
questioned whether the mere possibility that C could look to some of B's assets
(as opposed to a direct alternative source of payment) should make the production
payment a debt. In the Anderson case, it was held that a reservation of a fee interest
in the property in addition to the interest in the payment nullified the independent
interest. The Court said, 310 U.S. at 412, that the interest was not "dependent
entirely upon the production of oil for the deferred payments," because some of the
deferred payments might have been derived from sales of the fee title to the land
conveyed. Anderson would therefore suggest that the mere possibility of another
source would destroy the validity of the payment. Subsequent cases in the hard
mineral industry seem to support an independent interest, however, where terms
provided for the possibility of other sources. See Myers v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.
495 (1948); Herndon Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 628 (1946). This prob-
lem might be avoided if it is reasonably expected that the payment will be liquidated
solely from oil and gas. However, it would still probably be advisable to heed
Anderson. See generally The Guaranteed Production Payment Dilemma, 14 On. &
GAS TAx Q. 1 (1964).
7o Welsch, supra note 32, at 500. Rowen states that the Service has given indi-
cations that, as long as the fixed price is not unreasonable, it would approve a
transaction with such a guarantee. There have been no rulings, however. Purchaser
967.
71 Welsch, supra note 32, at 500.
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approach, B would be obliged to capitalize the amount of the payment as
an extra cost of acquiring the property and would be unable to exclude
the proceeds from his income. The effect of this would be to disqualify
the production payment as a separate property interest.
72
1. The Carve Out Approach
The applicability of the carve out theory turns upon whether the oil
payment would fall within the boundaries defining a carve out. A 1963
Fifth Circuit case established the rule that an oil payment which was carved
from a depletable property and which had a payout which could be pre-
dicted with reasonable accuracy when it was sold, would be designated
a carve out.73 Since the economic viability of the ABC depends upon
the certain payout of C's interest, this rule could easily be applied to
the ABC transaction.
If the carve out theory were adopted, a serious problem of when
to tax B on the attributed income would arise. If B is to be considered
as making a carve out to C, it might be argued that C's purchase price
should be treated for tax purposes as received by B, and that B conse-
quently should be considered as receiving presently realized income. Lake
supports such an argument, since it held that the income obtained on the
assignment of the carve out was taxable when received (here the year
in which C would pay A for the oil payment.) 74  If this result were
adopted, B's income would be bunched undesirably into one year, with
a tax being placed upon income which B would not receive under any
other theory until later. Under an ordinary cash purchase, on the other
hand, B would be taxed only as the oil was produced.
2. The Mortgage-Loan Theory
The mortgage-loan theory would treat B as if he had gone to a bank,
borrowed the needed funds, mortgaged all the oil and gas property, and
then repaid the loan out of income from the property.75  B would then be-
a mortgagor and C a mortgagee. Since B had no personal liability in the
ABC, it is perhaps more precise to liken C to a secured lender-creditor
who looks only to the production payment for his recovery.
76
72 Purchaser 962.
73 United States v. Foster, 324 F.2d 702, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1963).
74 Commissioner v. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958). The fact that Lake held the
amount received to be depletable income is not inconsistent with the loan approach,
because the conclusion in that case stemmed from a premise which is inapplicable to
the loan situation-that proceeds received on the sale of a carve out constitute a
mere anticipation of income. Id. at 265-66.
75 See ABC 19-20. The loan concept was generated to a large extent by Com-
missioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956), in which an undivided share in
operating interests was assigned until the assignees received a sum of money which
was net of costs and expenses. When that occurred, the interests were to revert
to the assignors. It was held that the transaction resembled a nonpersonal loan in
which the assigned share was pledged to secure the sums advanced, and that the
assignors realized income as the loan was repaid. But cf. Estate of Weinert v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
76 Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P. G. Lake Case, 14 So. CAL. TAX INsT. 47, 71 (1962). B's capitalization of the
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Many distinguishing features have been advanced in an attempt to
demonstrate that the mortgage-loan theory would be inadequate. 77 It has
been pointed out that the debtor is personally liable in a typical mortgage
situation and that liens attach to the entire property, while in the ABC,
B is not personally liable and liens do not attach to his interests.7  These
features, however, are not essential for the existence of a valid debt. Debts
payable in a special way, or from restricted funds, have been held to be
valid obligations.79 Moreover, the fact that a lender could look only to a
pledged security and not to a personal liability for repayment has been
found sufficient to support the validity of loans in the related area of
deductions for bad debts8 0 Finally, mortgages unsupported by personal
obligations have been found to create valid indebtedness8 l C's willingness
to look only to the production payment should not void the debt classifica-
tion. Indeed, as a practical matter, the existence of this limited security
loses all significance if it can be shown that B induced C to settle for it
on the basis of a strong certainty of payout.
8 2
production payment might produce an unusual tax result in the following situation.
Assume that B purchases the leasehold for one million dollars and C the oil payment
for four million dollars. A fire then occurs in one of the wells, resulting in a com-
plete loss. The question arises whether B should be able to deduct five million
dollars since he capitalized the oil payment, even though his out of pocket loss was only
one million dollars, and whether C is entitled to deduct four million dollars in losses
since his assets also perished in the fire. One authority has contended that the mort-
gage theory would permit a "double loss deduction" in such a situation. Id. at 23-24.
This conclusion apparently assumes that use of a mortgage-loan theory for purposes
of income attribution necessarily binds the Service to that theory to resolve legal
ownership for purposes of computing loss deductions. Such is not the case: loss
deductions should only be allowed for economic losses suffered by the taxpayer.
Thus, in the above situation, B should only be allowed to deduct his one million
dollar payment for the leasehold, and C should be accorded a four million dollar
loss deduction.
77 See ABC 22-23.
78 Benjamine & Currier, The Supreme Court and Taxation of Oil, Gas and Pro-
duction Payments: The Lake Cases, 19 LA. L. REv. 579, 610 (1959). Appleman
maintains the fact that the financing institution possessed a lien on all the property
should not alter the result in the ABC as long as C is limited to the production pay-
ment for his security. In support of this contention he offers the following example:
A owns a lease worth two million dollars, and B wishes to buy it through the ABC.
A bank will finance the production payment to the extent of $1,250,000, but wants
liens on all the property. B purchases the working interest subject to the debt and
mortgage and A reserves an oil payment for $1,250,000. A then sells the reserved
payment to C, who assumes the debt and releases A. The bank now has a mortgage
to secure a debt. ABC Deal 553-54. But see Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1
(1947) (indicating the debt might be attributed to B and the discharge be taxable
income to him).
79 5 MEavs, FEmALk IxcomE TAXATION § 30.03, at 17-18 (1964).
80 Ibid.
81 See Tanenbaum, The ABC Technique of Financing Real Estate Acquisitions:
The Tax Motivated Leasehold, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 161, 164 (1962) : "One possible
distinction between the ordinary purchase money mortgage transaction and the ABC
acquisition is the absence of a personal obligation from B to C in the latter. How-
ever, while mortgages often do include such an obligation, it is not uncommon for
the bond obligee to be a straw party; some mortgages do not even include a bond.
In either of these events, C's remedy realistically is limited to the value of the property
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Another argument against the mortgage-loan theory focuses on C's
separate liability for the taxes and expenses attributable to ownership of
the oil payment. This incident of ownership is considered inconsistent
with the classification of the oil payment as B's mortgaged property.
8 3
Such an argument seems entirely to ignore the many items in addition to
interest which are usually added to the amount of the payment. For
example, it is standard to add to the payment's face amount a sum to re-
imburse C for the state property and franchise taxes he will incur by hold-
ing the interest. Many other incidental expenses such as legal and record-
ing fees are also taken into consideration in computing the amount of the
oil payment. These practices certainly demonstrate the illusoriness of C's
"independent ownership." 85
Adoption of the mortgage-loan approach would also eliminate an in-
congruity created by the present treatment of the ABC. That the pur-
chase price of assets is not deductible when paid or incurred is an axiom
of tax law. To recoup his investment, the taxpayer must rely upon depre-
ciation, depletion or amortization deductions over the useful life of the
asset. B's current treatment under the ABC is an exception to this con-
cept. He is not taxed on the income used to repay the financer (C), and
the financed portion of the leasehold (the amount of the production pay-
ment) is not considered a part of his basis for depreciation or depletion.
The net effect of this approach is to allow B a deduction for the financed
portion of the purchase price as the loan is repaid, rather than having him
recover his investment gradually by depreciation deductions over the useful
life of the propertyY86 The mortgage-loan approach would also eliminate
the taxable year problem raised by the carve out theory. If C's purchase
of the production payment is treated as a loan of the purchase money to B,
B would have taxable income only as the oil is produced. Adoption of the
mortgage-loan theory in taxing B would thus not only complement the
proposed taxation of A, but would also be more in line with economic
reality.
C. The Taxation of C
C is the third principal in the ABC, functioning as the financier of the
transaction. His proceeds from the oil payment are currently taxed as
83 ABC 23.
84 For an accounting of the items added to the production payment in addition
to interest, see Bullion, Production Payment Transactions-Recent Developments, 6
RoCKY TAT. MINERAL L. INST. 81, 86 (1961). For a list of the items which the lending
institution demands be added to the production payment, see Early 940-41.
85 One approach, however, would solve the whole question by arguing that since
B does not legally own the production payment, he could not secure a loan on it
because he could not secure a mortgage on property he does not own. Therefore, it
would follow that this could not be a loan situation. ABC 20. This reasoning is
hardly inexorable.
86 Tanenbaunm, supra note 81, at 161.
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ordinary income subject to depletion 8 7 Since C will ordinarily finance
his purchase by borrowing from a bank, s8 the latter will hold a mortgage
on the production payment and an assignment of the oil runs. The bank
will also be able to look to C's general credit for the satisfaction of his
note.8 9 To compensate him for his participation in the ABC, C will demand
that the oil payment carry a higher rate of interest than that on his loan
agreement with the bank. This spread is C's profit.90
Since the ABC depends upon C's financing, any attack upon his par-
ticipation would have a direct effect upon the success of the entire trans-
action. One possible attack would be to bring C within the personal
holding company provisions of the 1954 Code.9 ' Under current definitions,
many C's would meet the necessary qualifications and could thus be sub-
jected to the high tax rates applicable in such a situation. However, C
need only distribute all its income to escape such treatment. If C is an
exempt organization,92 the Service has another method for affecting its
role in the ABC. The Service might simply withdraw C's nontaxable
status if it finds that C's principal activity is one of financing oil and gas
transactions.93 Although the oil payment is a relatively risk free invest-
ment bearing a good rate of interest, C's economic role is merely that of a
lender, and ending C's exemption could be justified on the ground that its
primary function is not to hold safe investments for charitable purposes
87 For discussions of C's taxation, see Minyard, How To Determine the Tax
Saving That Makes an ABC Deal Worthwhile, 12 J. TAXATION 290, 292 (1960);
ABC 18-19. Since C has a basis equal to the cash which he paid A, he will usually
employ cost rather than percentage depletion. Early 943-44.
88 In 1961, the Petroleum Division of Chase Manhattan Bank arranged for over
$600,000,000 of production payments on the ABC with acquisition costs of approxi-
mately one billion dollars. Hulsey, New Problems in ABC Financing, 13 INsT. OIL
& GAS L. & TAX. 539 (1962). Because it is dependent upon bank financing, the form
of the production payment will many times be attributable to the demands of the bank.
For an example of a typical provision a bank might want, see Purchaser 965.
89 Galvin 1501.
90 Sometimes this spread is required so that the lending institution can conform
with the requirements of supervisory agencies that the funds advanced must be "loans,"
not "purchases." Bullion, Production Payment Transactions-Recent Developments,
6 RocKY MT. MINERAL L. INsT. 81, 85 n.12 (1961).
91 If C is a private business with more than half the value of its stock owned
directly or indirectly by or for not more than five individuals and if at least 60%
of its adjusted ordinary gross income is personal holding company income within
the meaning of § 543(a) of the 1954 Code, then C is a personal holding company
under § 542(a), and must pay a tax "equal to 70% of the undistributed personal holding
company income" under § 541. Although C has a possible escape route from the
§ 541 tax under § 543(a) (3), it is factually unlikely that he will be able to qualify
thereunder. See Early 948.
9 2 If C is an exempt organization, income from a purchased oil payment is usually
not subject to tax under § 511 (a) (1), since it is not considered as unrelated business
income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(b) (1964).
93 If C has no other substantial assets and borrows the funds to purchase the
payment, the Service may label this a passive investment and withdraw the exemption
even though the return may be spent on charity. Appleman asserts that taxing only
where there is borrowing is blatant "administrative legislation." ABC Deal 548.
This particular Service tack is essentially the application of the ideas in Rev. Rul.
54-420, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 128, which involved a foundation's purchase of the stock
of a business corporation with payment of the purchase price deferred. The founda-
tion obtained the assets in dissolution and sold, leased or licensed them to an operating
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but rather to help finance the oil and gas industry 4 A case by case ap-
proach would be required to determine whether C fell within the spirit
of the exempting statute. The motivation of such an investment, the pos-
sible inducements held out by the oil and gas industry, and investment
alternatives should all be considered in reaching a conclusion on this ques-
tion. For example, a hastily incorporated charity which was designed
only to provide a receptacle for the oil payment would fail to qualify. On
the other hand, the simple fact that an independent charity chose to utilize
this mode of investment should not automatically deprive it of an exemption.
Because their chief effect is discouragement of participation in future
ABC transactions, neither of the above approaches speaks to the key issue
raised by C's position in the ABC. This issue stems from the present
classification of C's ownership of the oil payment. In oil taxation the
person who has the economic interest in a certain property declares the
income from the property.95 The current difficulty in attributing proceeds
from the production payment to B is not simply that C has title to them,
but rather that C is recognized as holding an independent economic interest
because of his ownership of the production payment. In order to impress
any attributive income theory upon the ABC, this treatment must be
changed.
1. The Production Payment: Whose Income?
Where several individuals hold different interests in an income pro-
ducing property, it will often be difficult to ascertain who is obliged to
declare the income. Although the simple answer is that the "owner" is
so obliged, it is difficult in such situations to decide who should be recog-
nized as bearing this taxable identity. The problem may then be to ask
whether the person who actually owns the underlying asset has divided his
interest in the property only to divert income to another and thus to avoid
taxes. If he has, the division will not eliminate his tax responsibility. This
issue is not new to tax law; the cases which speak to the subject distinguish
between legal title to income as it flows from the property and basic tax
company, and the latter paid over most of its income as rents or royalties to the
foundation. The foundation used 90% of this income to liquidate its debt. It was
held that the foundation was not engaged exclusively in activities coming within the
contemplation of the exempting statute, and that in any event the rents and royalties
were income from an unrelated business. It was also declared that the use of income
to retire indebtedness incurred in the acquisition of income producing property con-
stituted an accumulation which might be unreasonable. See Early 952. Analogous
to this situation is the "bootstrap" technique by which charities purchase businesses
in order to give capital gains rather than ordinary income to the selling owners. For
a discussion of this problem, see Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of
a Business, 108 U. PA. L. Rtv. 623 (1960); MacCracken, Selling a Business to a
Charitable Foundation, 1954 U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 205; Moore & Dohan, Sales,
Churches anid Monkeyshines, 11 TAX L. Rxv. 87 (1956).
9 C's narrow profit spread, coupled with the wasting risk-type nature of the
asset, have been cited in support of this conclusion. ABC Deal 548.
95 See Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1961)
(Wisdom, J.).
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responsibility for that income. 6 The essence of this distinction was noted
by Mr. Justice Stone in Helvering v. Horst97 when he stated that the
income must be "realized" by the one "who owns or controls the source
of the income." In a sense, the goal is to tax the person who is actually
responsible for the production of the income-the person at the bottom of
the investment.
These considerations are of equal importance in oil and gas taxation;
indeed, the same distinction between legal title and tax responsibility is a
basis of the Lake decision. Within this context it is at least arguable that
B, and not C, is the party who is actually responsible for the production of
the oil payment income. His ownership of the working interest would
certainly seem to give him control of "the source of the income." In light
of these considerations, the classification of C's holding as an economic
interest must be reevaluated.
2. Percentage Depletion and Economic Interests
The concept of economic interest was a byproduct of certain changes
made in the law of depletion allowances. To receive percentage depletion
the taxpayer must possess an economic interest in the property. But
ownership of such an interest, as mentioned above, carries with it the
responsibility to declare the income from the property as well as the right
to receive the benefit of depletion. It is thus reasonable to conclude that
only an investor intended by Congress to receive the benefit of depletion
should own the economic interest and be obliged to declare the income.
The type of investment in the property that Congress intended to receive
depletion is best revealed by tracing the history of percentage depletion.
When the income tax was first introduced, oil producers were al-
lowed to write off as tax deductions the cost of all properties acquired
after March 1, 1913. Because this procedure created serious inequities-
a highly valuable property could have been acquired at a low cost while
a less productive property might have cost much more-Congress decided
in 1918 to permit every discoverer to write off the value of the minerals
in the ground. Two of its major purposes for adopting such an approach
were to compensate for the high risk involved and to furnish an incentive
for exploration and discovery. The new procedure required the taxpayer
to establish market value within thirty days of the deposit's discovery;
this value could then be written off as the minerals were produced. This
new method, which was termed "discovery value depletion," led to several
complications, many of which could be traced to the thirty day limitation.
In 1926 Congress therefore developed the current system of percentage
depletion. This system was intended to give the same result as discovery
Q6Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S.
122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Blair v. Commissioner, 300
U.S. 5 (1937).
97311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940).
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depletion by providing a continuing deduction of twenty-seven and one
half percent of the gross income from the oil and gas production.
98
To receive this percentage depletion the taxpayer must possess an
economic interest in the property. The Supreme Court, in the 1932 case
of Palmer v. Bender9 9 established two requirements for such an interest:
(1) the taxpayer must have acquired an interest in the minerals in place
by investment, and (2) he must look to the income derived from the
extraction of the oil for the return of his capital.
Under present tax treatment, the ABC production payment is con-
sidered to meet the qualifications established in Palmer and is therefore
accorded the status of an economic interest. It is true, of course, that C
must look to the oil income for the return of his investment. It is also
true that C has, in a legal sense, made an "investment" which gives him
an interest in the oil in place. Yet it does not follow that he has made
the type of investment which should qualify as an "economic interest."
Since the present scheme of depletion was designed to compensate for the
risk involved in exploration and to furnish an incentive for initial invest-
ments, the reward of percentage depletion should only be given to those
who are actually responsible for the development of the property. As
Judge Wisdom has observed: "The issue is an economic one. The stake
in the minerals is what counts: the income from oil and gas is taxable
to the man who risks his stake to produce the oil and gas." 100 In sum,
the history of percentage depletion indicates that Congress intended to give
this benefit only to those investors who have taken a risk to develop the oil;
it was not intended for investors who merely come in to buy rights to a
certain amount of oil after the property is developed and producing.
Only those who have made a risk bearing capital investment should be
awarded an economic interest.
3. The Nature of C's Interest
C has not made such a risk bearing investment. Under the basic
ABC theory of independent ownership of the production payment, C should
be an equal investor with B; his risks and rate of return, however, are
more analogous to those of a lender-creditor than to those of a risk
bearing investor. 10 1 The weightiest factors pointing to such a conclusion
are the actual nature of what is being reserved and the positions of invest-
98 TEXACO OIL COMPANY, PERCENTAGE DEPLETION 4 (1964). The system also
imposed a 50% net income limitation as an upper limit for deductions.
99 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
100 Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1961).
(Emphasis added.)
101 But see id. at 759:
A carried interest transaction or a carved out production payment may take
the form of a loan with assignment by way of security, but it is a lending
arrangement that would have been unfamiliar to Sir Edward Coke or William
Blackstone. Its characteristics are so unlike a conventional loan that for
modern tax purposes it should not be treated as loans are traditionally treated.
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ment in which the parties stand. C's interest is more a contractual right
to collect a stated amount of money from the production of oil than it
is an investment for development of the leasehold. His narrow and set
interest margin does not resemble the type of profit associated with oil
investments, but is more like that earned on a loan or a bond-like invest-
ment. The payment of a discounted ten dollars for ten dollars worth
of oil is not a true risk investment. Although C's rights like those of an
investor do eventually cease, this feature of his interest stems from the
limits of the contract and not from the depletion of the oil. Moreover,
although C bears the entire risk that the production payment will not pay-
out, the reality of that risk is questionable. As indicated above, the ABC
deal incorporates an oil payment with an almost certain payout.10 2 C's
meaningful risks would therefore appear to be the market for the oil
(which affects the quantity produced and the price received) and the
production quotas imposed by state law. But interest rates (which com-
pensate for any delar in payout) and fixed dollar amounts on the oil
payment (which to a great extent nullify the market effect to C) make
these risks negligible. 10 3 Indeed, the interest being paid on the produc-
tion payment is usually a little higher than that which C would have
received on a more solid security.104 C's risks are further reduced because
his interest does not continue for the life of the lease, and his return there-
fore comes when the property is substantially undepleted. 15
These aspects of C's interest indicate that he has not made a risk
bearing capital investment. He should thus have neither the right to
depletion nor the right to be treated as owning an economic interest. On
the other hand, B's interest would seem to qualify for both rights. It is
B who is actually at the bottom of the ABC. Possessing most of the
economic rights in the property, B takes the actual risks in the transaction.
Since he is dependent upon the market, and holds a long term investment
which continues for the life of the lease, he assumes the hazard of over
estimated reserves. B's interest is the type which was intended to receive
depletion; he should thus be accorded an economic interest in the entire
property and be responsible for declaring all of the income.
C's tax status will not be altered by reclassifying the nature of his
interest in the oil payment. Under the current tax treatment, the nature
of his loan-type investment will prompt C to use cost rather than per-
centage depletion to recoup his investment costs tax free; the same result
102 See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
103 See Tanenbaum, supra note 81, at 166.
104 See ABC 21.
105 C's security is also increased by a covenant which enables him to take over
the property if B negligently operates it. Moreover, his security is further strength-
ened by B's obligation not to dispose of or sublease the property without C's consent
Purchaser 968. There is actually a distinct similarity between this question and that of
the stock-bond dichotomy in corporate taxation, where courts have not been hesitant
to sort out the equity interests from the credit interests. For a complete discussion
of this latter area, see BlrricER, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 113-20 (1959).
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can be obtained by amortization. Such a procedure will give C the same
tax result he presently receives, while leading to an economically sounder
rationale for reaching that result.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE ABC TRANSACTION
A. The Integrated Pattern
Any proposal for changing the tax treatment of the ABC transactionI'0
must determine whose tax status is to be altered. Since A has sold his
entire asset, it would appear reasonable to award him capital gains on the
proceeds. Viewing the A-B conveyance as a credit sale would not alter
this result. C's status would also appear justified; despite the economic
realties of his role in the transaction, he should still be permitted to obtain
a return of his investment tax free. A denial of an economic interest
1o0 SIf any change in taxation were attempted, a controversial question would be
whether the Service now has the authority to alter its long standing rules or whether
it must instead wait for legislative action. It has been stated that long standing
administrative practices of the Service have the effect of law where Congress has
had both the knowledge and opportunity to legislate but does not. ABC 24; Ray &
Hammonds, The Income Tax on Proceeds from the Sale of Oil Payments: The
Validity of G.C.M. 24849, 25 TEXAS L. Rv. 121, 134 (1946). The Supreme Court
spoke to this point in United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956), when
the Service attempted to impose stamp tax liability on corporate notes. For years
the Service had held such notes immune from taxation. The court held: "Against
the Treasury's prior long standing and consistent administrative interpretation its
more recent ad hoc contention as to how the statute should be construed cannot stand.
Moreover, that original interpretation has had both express and implied congressional
acquiescence . . . through Congress having let the administrative interpretation remain
undisturbed for so many years. . . ." Id. at 396-97; accord Commissioner v. Estate
of Marshall L. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965); Cory Corp. v. Sauber, 363 U.S. 709
(1960) (per curiam) ; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
Although the Service has issued ABC rulings for years, it would seem that there
has not been any "express or implied Congressional acquiescence" in its treatment.
In proposing legislation to deal with the carve out question there is evidence that
Congress was aware of the ABC. See STAFFS OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION & THE TREASURY DEP'T, 84TH CONG., 2d Sess., LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE UN-
INTENDED BENEFITS AND HARDSHIPS AND ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR TEcHNICAL
AMENDMENTS BILL OF 1957 (1956); Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on
Ways and Means on Technical Amendments to the Internal Revemne Code, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess., 259 (1956). From this, one author has asserted that "since Con-
gress knew of the administrative practice of the Internal Revenue Service dealing
with the ABC transactions and made no change in that practice, it is clear that
Congress has approved such treatment . . . . [T]herefore there is no basis or author-
ity for a change in this practice without Congressional action." ABC 27-29. Al-
though it could be argued that long standing administrative practice should not be
lightly overturned, to assume that Congress approved of this method while dealing
with another question seems highly tenuous, to say the least. See also Schoenbaum,
New Legislation Regulations and Other Recent Developments Affecting the Taxation
of Oil and Gas Income, 8 TuLANE TAX INST. 338, 355 (1959). See generally Surrey,
The Scope and Effect of Treamry Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift
Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. Rxv. 556 (1940). Moreover, it must be remembered that Lake
pointed out that prior administrative practice is always subject to change through
exercise by the administrative agency of its continued rule making power. It would
seem that if a certain treatment demands alteration the Service should be able to make
such a change in order to give effective application to the Code. Only expressly
purposeful congressional inaction should affect this rule. Such an approach would
not conflict with the cases cited above, for they dealt only with whether administrative
practices would be followed, and not with whether they could be changed by the
Service. See Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432 (1941) ; Helvering v. Wilshire
Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100-01 (1939).
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coupled with the allowance of amortization would render the same return.
It is B's status which requires modification, for in allowing him to exclude
the production payment proceeds from his gross income, B is granted a
privilege not accorded similarly situated individuals under the Internal
Revenue Code. Application of a mortgage-loan theory would eliminate
this anomaly.
Adoption of the above theories would provide an integrated pattern
of taxation for the ABC. As discussed above, if the A-B transaction is
treated as a sale, A's retention of the oil payment should be treated as
a mere debt obligation of B, the purchaser. The conveyance from A to C
could then be considered as a transfer of an account receivable. If this
is a credit transaction for A, it should also be a credit transaction for B
and C. C would be treated as holding a claim for money and would be
considered a creditor-lender. Viewing the transaction in this light ties
the ABC together into a logical pattern.
Bearing in mind that there have been no cases determining the tax
consequences of ABC transactions, the above analysis would appear con-
sistent with the present law. The A-B transaction is already considered
to be a sale; moreover, treating an oil payment with a certain payout
as a liquidated claim for money is borne out by the theory of Lake.
Although the Internal Revenue Service has gone along with the present
treatment, the authorities would seem to call for an application of the
above approach.
B. Economic and Noneconomic Interests
The tax problems raised by the ABC and similar oil payment trans-
actions can best be solved by reclassifying all production payments as
either economic or noneconomic interests. A case by case factual analysis
would be necessary to determine whether or not the holder has made
the necessary risk bearing capital investment. All those interests-such
as royalties-which continue for the life of the lease should be considered
as economic interests, because the owner of such an interest risks his
stake for the life of the lease, and actually gambles on the ultimate value
of the developed reserves. Since the oil payment owner has an interest
of limited duration, it would seem that the only situation in which he
makes the necessary risk-type investment is where he invests in undevel-
oped property and receives an oil payment whose payout is uncertain.
In such a situation, the holder does make a contribution to the develop-
ment of the property and assumes an actual risk that the investment will
not be returned. If the holder of the production payment has not made
the necessary investment, both the right to depletion and the obligation
to declare the income would devolve upon the person who is most re-
sponsible for the production of the income-in most instances, the owner
of the working interest. Application of this working model would seem
necessary to square taxation of the ABC transaction with economic reality.
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